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Carryover effects of emotions that lead to biases in social judgments are commonly
observed. We suggest that such effects may be influenced by the ability to engage
or disengage attention from emotional stimuli. We assessed the ability to activate
and inhibit attention to anger stimuli, experimentally induced anger in a demanding
task, and measured social judgment toward an ambiguous target. Results show that
higher activation and higher inhibition of anger-related information predicted more biased
evaluations of the ambiguous target when individuals were experiencing anger, but not
in an emotionally neutral condition. Interestingly, the effect of activation and inhibition in
the anger condition emerged only when such variables were entered simultaneously
in the regression model, indicating that they had an additive effect in predicting
carryover effects of anger on social judgement. Results are consistent with a cooperative
suppression effect (Conger, 1974) of activation and inhibition and may be explained by
either an increased accessibility of anger-related cues leading to more biased social
judgments, or by an instance in which being good at engaging in and disengaging
attention from emotional cues might have depleted participants’ resources making
carryover effects of anger more likely to occur. Ultimately, the finding highlight that
individual differences in attentional processes are important moderators for carryover
effects of emotions.
Keywords: attention, inhibition, activation, anger, cooperative suppression, self-regulation failure, carryover
effects, resources depletion
INTRODUCTION
It is not unusual to have a bad day at work and end up blaming one’s partner at home for something
that was nobody’s fault. Are some people better than others at letting go of negative events?
Which emotional processes influence how people perceive others after experiencing anger? This
study seeks to answer these questions by examining how incidental anger, that is, anger triggered
by a reason unrelated to the current event, in combination with individuals’ engagement in or
disengagement from anger-related stimuli, biases social judgments.
Anger is a pervasive emotion in everyday life, often requires some form of regulation, and may
have quite di erent e ects depending on the circumstances. Sometimes feeling angry may boost
resource mobilization in a profitable way, for example by promoting approach tendencies that
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 September 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1435
fpsyg-08-01435 September 22, 2017 Time: 16:47 # 2
Fiori and Shuman Anger Inhibition and Activation
remove obstacles toward the desired goal (Carver and Harmon-
Jones, 2009). At other times it may interfere with performance
by drawing attention away from the task or by influencing
judgments and behavior regardless of the true source of anger
(Lerner and Tiedens, 2006).
Emotions often guide information processing and behavior
in an adaptive way, but not always. Throughout evolution,
the active interpretation of emotional signals has increased the
chances of survival (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). However,
relying on emotions when decisions have nothing to do with the
true cause of one’s emotions may bias information processing
(Forgas, 1995; Figure 1A). For example, happiness and sadness
increase attention to a ect-consistent information and result in
judging others more positively or negatively, respectively (Forgas
and Bower, 1987). Similarly, individuals who experience anger
provide more punitive judgments of unrelated targets (Lerner
et al., 1998). The e ect of emotions on decision-making is a
well-established phenomenon (Forgas, 1991). Mood congruent
e ects consist of judgments biased toward the currentmood state.
According to the mood-as-information theory current mood
serves, implicitly, as a source of information for the judgment at
hand (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). An individual typically uses the
appraisals associated with a ective states as information about
a current situation, but the appraisals may also be carried over
to an unrelated event and bias information processing (e.g.,
Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). Another account that explains bias
is the automatic activation of semantic networks that bring
emotion congruent material to mind and influence attention and
interpretations (Bower, 1981).
Individuals may di er from each other in how much they
carry over their emotions to other events. They can regulate
their a ective reactions by increasing and decreasing how much
attention they pay to emotional stimuli. Selecting certain aspects
of the situation through one’s focus of attention may be used
as a regulatory strategy to prolong a desirable emotional state,
or to change an undesired state (Wadlinger and Isaacowitz,
2011). Individual di erences in the ability to disengage attention
from stimuli are associated with reduced negative a ect already
in infants (Rothbart et al., 1992). Young children actively
manage their emotions by avoiding sensory input from negative
emotional stimuli, for example, by closing their eyes. Older
children additionally learn to redirect their attention internally
(e.g., by thinking about something else; see Thompson, 1994). In
adults, too, the ability to disengage attention has been associated
with reduced emotional reactions (Compton, 2000). In contrast,
ruminating about anger related events prolongs anger (Rusting
and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Individuals can use engagement of
attention to prolong emotions, and thereby increase a carryover
of emotions to unrelated situations. They can use disengagement
of attention to end emotions, and thereby prevent a carryover of
emotions to unrelated situations.
However, being able to disengage attention from emotional
stimuli may not always reduce the carryover of emotions to new
situations, and therefore reduce bias in subsequent information
processing. For example, individuals high in negative a ect
who were asked to suppress negative feelings while recalling
negative events experienced more negative emotions than
individuals who had not received the instruction to suppress
feelings (Dalgleish et al., 2009). Trying to suppress happiness
or sadness in a cognitively demanding situation may lead to
the opposite result. In ironic process theory (Wegner, 1994),
individuals who were instructed to suppress thoughts about
a ‘white bear’ express more thoughts about it as compared
to individuals who had not received instructions to suppress
thoughts. Eventually it was demonstrated that the attempt to
avoid certain thoughts/information may cause such thoughts
to be more accessible, producing a backfire e ect that was
documented in the literature as rebound or ironic e ect (Wegner,
1994, 2009). It was hypothesized that two processes are engaged
during thought suppression: an automatic process or ‘monitoring
system,’ which searches for instances of the unwanted thought
and does not require cognitive resources to run; and a controlled
process or ‘operating system,’ which is activated any time the
unwanted thought is found with the purpose of replacing it with
something else. Increased accessibility of the suppressed thought
may occur: (a) at the moment in which the person is attempting
to suppress it, in case cognitive load weakens the operating
system; or (b) after suppression successfully occurred, when the
operating system is relaxed or terminated. In the latter case, also
known as ‘the post-suppression rebound e ect’ (Wegner, 1994),
individuals may be e ective in suppressing certain thoughts until
control is exerted. As soon as control is released, the rebound
e ect may appear.
Clark et al. (1991) tested the rebound hypothesis using this
experimental design: Participants listened to a taped story and
verbalized their thoughts during 2 time periods. For the first
recall, one group was told to express any thought that came
to mind except thoughts referring to the tape (suppression
condition); another group was told to express any thought
(control condition); and the third group was told to express any
thought including those referring to the tape (control condition).
For the second recall, all three groups were asked to think
about any thought that came to mind. The authors did not
find increased accessibility of thoughts related to the tape in the
suppression group during the first recall. However, participants
in the suppression condition displayed increased accessibility
of thoughts related to the tape during the second recall, when
they did not have specific suppression instructions. This may be
explained by the fact that the monitoring system may continue
to work even after the operating system has stopped and lead
to hypersensitivity to the suppressed thought. The result is the
paradoxical e ect that suppressed thoughts end up working as
retrieval cues.
These findings suggest that inhibiting the processing of
anger stimuli may later result in increased reactivity in
cognitively demanding anger arousing events, subsequently
biasing information processing.
Lord and Levy (1994) suggested that activation and inhibition
are fundamental processes for regulating behavior. Activation
ensures the consideration of goal-relevant information, whereas
inhibition prevents goal-irrelevant information from interfering
with task execution. Inhibition is defined as «the stopping or
overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, with or
without intention. The mental process so influenced might
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the study’s hypotheses. (A) The typical carryover effect of emotion on judgment; (B) activation accentuates and inhibition reduces
carryover effects of emotion on judgment; activation and inhibition both accentuates carryover effects of emotion on judgment.
be selective attention or memory retrieval or a host of other
cognitive processes.» (MacLeod, 2007, p. 5). In this paper, we
examine how the activation and inhibition of attention to anger
stimuli influences the carryover of anger as reflected in biased
social information processing after experiencing incidental anger.
In the present research, activation and inhibition were
measured employing a task that presents similarities with
a ective negative priming in the emotion literature (e.g.,
Joormann and Gotlib, 2010) and semantic priming in the
cognitive literature (e.g., Ortells et al., 2001). The task consisted
of a series of two consecutive trials (Figure 2). In the prime trial,
two diagrams representing faces with di erent emotions (anger,
sadness, and happiness) were presented next to each other in two
di erent colors (green and blue), and participants were instructed
to pay attention to only the green face. In the test trial, a letter
string appeared and participants had to indicate whether the
letter string was a word, as in a typical lexical decision task (LDT).
Participants responded by pressing a letter on the computer
keyboard designated as ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ The word could either be
related in a ective tone to the face participants were instructed
to look at (the target), to the face participants were instructed
to ignore (the distractor), or unrelated to both (the control
condition). Response Time (RT) to the LDT was used to calculate
activation and inhibition for three emotion categories: anger,
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the attention task employed in the study.
sadness, and happiness. In every trial, after the LDT participants
performed a categorization task. They indicated, among a list of
four options, which emotion was conveyed by the green face.
This latter task was introduced to ensure that participants paid
attention to the expression conveyed by the prime.
Performance in the LDT involving the judgment of a word
related to the target was expected to be facilitated, both in
terms of speed of processing and in terms of correct answering.
According to the associative network model (Bower, 1981)
information is stored in nodes that are related by semantic and
a ective meaning. When a node is activated it also activates other
connected nodes. In the case of the present task, the prime should
activate a network of similar valence information that would
increase the accessibility of related nodes and, consequently,
foster correct responses.
Instead of being facilitated, performance involving the
judgment of a word related to the distractor was expected to
be impaired. Paying attention to a stimulus that was previously
dismissed from attention should interfere with task execution,
making information processing slower and performance more
challenging. Explanations of inhibition e ects include impaired
retrieval in processing information previously categorized as
distractors (Neill, 1977; Tipper, 1985, 2001; Yee, 1991; Houghton
and Tipper, 1994) and conflict between two possible responses:
‘select it’ because it is the current object of evaluation, or ‘ignore
it’ because it was first introduced as a distractor (Neill and Valdes,
1992). Both explanations support the presence of inhibitory
mechanisms that suppress responses–either memory retrieval or
attentional focus–suggesting that inhibitory processes play a role
in RT.
A study that employed the same paradigm discussed above
investigated the e ect of individual di erences in inhibition
on task performance characterized by emotional involvement
(Moon and Lord, 2006). The criterion measure was performance
on two tasks requiring fast emotion regulation: a scrambled
sentence task, and an editing task, both characterized by
time pressure, and high emotional content that, if not
regulated, could interfere with performance. Results showed that
di erence in RTs to the distractor-consistent stimulus predicted
performance.
Another study (Fiori and Antonakis, 2012) showed that
performance in the LDT requiring activation and inhibition of
emotion information was predicted by the fluid component of
intelligence, in particular as measured by Cattell’s Culture Fair
Test (Cattell et al., 1973). Interestingly, the only personality factor
that predicted performance was openness to experience, which
is the personality trait more strongly associated with general
intelligence, supporting the idea that activation and inhibition of
emotion information pertain to the intelligence, more than the
personality, domain.
Although attentional bias toward specific emotions, such as
fear, has been widely studied with reaction time paradigms,
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such as the stroop task (e.g., Fox et al., 2002), fewer studies
have investigated the role of individual di erences in attentional
processes as predictors of behavior outcomes. Several of the
studies employed self-report measures of anger, rather than
performance-based measures (e.g., Denson et al., 2012). One
study showed that individuals low, as compared to high, in stroop
task performance designed tomeasure general attentional control
judged moral behavior more severely after being primed with
disgust.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
We investigated individual di erences in anger-specific
activation and inhibition as moderators of the relationship
between anger and social judgment. More specifically, the study
was designed to analyze the role of individual di erences in
the activation and inhibition of anger-related information in a
situation in which anger was not related to the task at hand and
to observe the e ect on performance. In particular, the reaction
to anger was analyzed with respect to its influence on forming
impressions of an ambiguous character that is completely
unrelated to the experience of anger and that could be perceived
as more or less hostile.
We hypothesized that individuals higher in activation to anger
stimuli would show more bias in a social judgment task after
an anger manipulation, and that individuals higher in inhibition
would show less bias in this situation because of their capacity
to disengage from anger stimuli (Hypothesis 1a, Figure 1B).
Given that the literature on ironic processes has suggested that
suppressing emotions may lead to an ironic increase in such
feelings (Dalgleish et al., 2009) we also posited an alternative that
inhibition may increase biases in judgments because of ironic
processes (Hypothesis 1b, Figure 1C). A relatively demanding
task during emotion induction allowed for the post-suppression
rebound e ect.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Design and Procedure
To examine these hypotheses, we used three tasks. The first
task measured the ability to activate and inhibit attention
to anger related stimuli. Reactivity to anger induction was
then assessed with an anger manipulation. Finally, potential
biases in information processing were assessed in a social
judgment task. The study had a 2 ⇥ 2 mixed design with
attention to anger-related information (activation and inhibition)
measured within subjects and emotion induction (anger/control)
manipulated between subjects. The dependent variable was
the extent of negative trait ratings in the social judgment
task.
Participants
Ninety participants (46 females) were recruited from a US
Midwestern University subject-pool in exchange for partial
course credit. During the funnel debriefing, two participants
seemed to know the purpose of the experiment from the
beginning. Furthermore, data for three participants were lost due
to error in administration of Eprime. These five participants were
dropped from the analyses. In the end 85 out of 90 were retained
for the statistical analysis, with 45 participants assigned to the
anger condition (25 females) and 40 to the control condition
(20 females). This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the ‘O ce for the Protection of Research
Subjects (OPRS) of the University of Illinois at Chicago’ with
written informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the ‘IRB of the
OPRS.’ Participants were 53% females and 47% males. The
mean age was 19.13 (SD = 2.05), with age ranging between 17
and 28. The composition of the sample was: Asians (40.4%),
Whites (29.2%), Hispanics (16.9%), and African-Americans
(7.9%). A small percentage of individuals (5.6%) did not indicate
their race.
Measures
Attention Task
The procedure of the task was the same employed in other
studies (Moon and Lord, 2006; Fiori and Antonakis, 2012). The
task consisted of 96 consecutive trials. In each trial, 2 diagrams
representing emotional facial expressions (anger, sadness, and
happiness) were presented side by side, one in green and one
in blue (Figure 1). These basic emotions were selected because
they were clearly identified by participants in previous research
(Shaver et al., 1987). Face diagrams were created according
to emotion expression key features indicated by Ekman and
Friesen. In each trial two faces, measuring 2 inches ⇥ 2 inches
each, were displayed side by side for 200 ms. Participants were
instructed to attend to the green face, which changed side
randomly across trials for each participant, so that participants
had to look at both facial expressions to identify the one they
had to attend to. Then, a letter string appeared for 3 s and
participants indicated whether it was a word, as in a typical
LDT. The letter string was either congruent in valence with
the target face (for example, a green angry face followed by an
‘anger’ word), or congruent with the distractor face (for example,
a blue angry face followed by an ‘anger’ word). Letter strings
were systematically varied from a list of synonyms of emotional
words referring to anger, sadness, happiness, and surprise, the
latter being included as a control condition, together with non-
words of the same length. To avoid inter-trial e ects1—the
activation of particular emotion information in one trial could
a ect the processing of emotion information in the next trial—
and to ensure that participants paid attention to the expression
conveyed by the face and not only its color, after each trial
participants performed a categorization task. They indicated
1Some studies demonstrated that there may be inter trial e ects or carryover e ects
following the processing of emotional stimuli. For instance, Sharma and McKenna
(2001) found a delay of 11 ms following the processing of negative stimuli at
intervals of 1000 ms. In the present study emotion processing was followed by the
lexical decision task and then the categorization task, making the inter trial interval
at least 4–5 s. This duration makes it unlikely that the inter trial e ect could have
influenced results.
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the emotion conveyed by the target face from a list of four
emotions.
Response Times (RTs) to anger-related words congruent with
the angry target face were taken as a measure of activation of
attention, with faster RTs indicating higher activation. RTs to
anger-related words congruent with the angry distractor face
were taken as a measure of inhibition, with slower RTs indicating
higher inhibition (for more information on the task, see Moon
and Lord, 2006; Fiori and Antonakis, 2012). There is an ongoing
debate regarding whether RTs to priming tasks, of the same
type as that employed in the current study, should be calculated
as di erence scores with respect to a control condition or as
simple RTs. We calculated di erence scores by subtracting RTs
in the anger congruent conditions with angry faces as a target
or distractor from RTs in the condition in which angry faces
(targets or distractors) were followed by happiness, sadness or
surprise words (control condition). Using simple RTs produced
the same pattern of results (see similar results in Chan et al.,
2006). Thus, for the sake of clarity when interpreting results
simple RTs were retained, and they are presented in the current
paper.
Anger Induction
The present study employed a modified version of an anger
induction procedure successfully used by Kenworthy et al. (2003)
and Pedersen et al. (2000; Study 2). Participants expected to
perform a task meant to analyze the influence of sounds on
performance: The task consisted of solving 15 anagrams while
listening to background sounds. Participants were invited to
wear headphones with a microphone. Before participants started
reading instructions about the experiment, the experimenter
informed them that the system was equipped with an audio-
recording system for which their response to the task would
be audio-recorded. Anagrams appeared on the screen for 10 s
each, followed by a screen prompt for the answer. Participants
had 5 s to provide the answer. They were told to solve the
anagrams and then say the answer aloud. In case they did not
know the answer, they were instructed to say ‘I don’t know’ out
loud.
There were three factors specifically related to the induction
of anger. First, anagrams were very di cult to solve, including
words such as pandemonium. Second, the sound in the
background was quite loud (60 db) and irritating (it was a passage
from Stravinsky’s ‘Rite of Spring’). Third, after the 4th, 8th,
and 12th anagram participants were interrupted by a message
popping up on the screen lamenting that the participant needed
to speak louder. The tone and intensity of the message increased
throughout the task and displayed more and more annoyance
and irritation. In the control condition participants solved much
easier anagrams, including words such as time, they listened to
a neutral background sound – the noise of light tra c recorded
in downtown Chicago on a weekday, which was also played
softer, and the interruption that popped up simply informed
participants how many anagrams remained until the end of the
task.
An anger manipulation of this kind was chosen because it
was related to a sort of incidental anger, rather than anger
directed to a social target, such as when the experimenter
explicitly mocks the participant for negative performance. For
the present study, the latter kind of anger induction was excluded
to avoid any unexpected priming of thoughts related to ‘social’
aspects of anger, which could have confounded results of the
subsequent impression formation task. Furthermore, this anger
manipulation has been proven to induce anger and frustration
more than other emotions (Kenworthy et al., 2003). No emotion
manipulation elicits only one emotion. However, because some
emotions may have di erent e ects on decision-making, it
is always important to ensure that the manipulation works
in the expected direction. The manipulation procedure lasted
approximately 5 min.
Social Judgment Task
Participants read a vignette taken from Srull and Wyer (1979)
regarding the description of a day in the life of Donald, the
protagonist. As pointed out by Otten and Stapel (2007), Srull and
Wyer’s (1979) task has been successfully used in several studies,
such as Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) and Devine (1989), to
demonstrate the e ects of priming on anger and aggression.
The vignette includes 20 sentences containing 5 somewhat
hostile but ambiguous behaviors (e.g., not letting a salesperson
enter an apartment). Participants the rated positive and negative
traits of the target person on a unipolar 9-point Likert scale. The
average rating for negative traits (hostile, unfriendly, dislikable,
boring, selfish, and narrow-minded) was the study’s dependent
variable.
Manipulation Checks
After the emotion manipulation (anagrams task), participants
filled out a questionnaire about their current emotional state.
Becoming aware of one’s emotional state may reduce the
impact of emotions on subsequent activities, especially when
such activities are unrelated to the emotion felt (Schwarz and
Clore, 1983), and labeling emotional states may reduce their
impact on judgment (Keltner et al., 1993). For these reasons
a subtle manipulation check was used. Instead of directly
asking participants whether they were irritated, depressed, or
relaxed, they were asked to rate how they found the music
(irritating, relaxing, and depressing), with questions such as
‘Did you find the music irritating.’ Responses were reported
on a Likert-type scale from 1 = not at all to 9 = very
much. Furthermore, questions related to the emotional state, in
particular ratings of irritation and sadness, were mixed with a
series of filler questions related to the task itself, such as ‘Do
you like working/studying with music in the background?’ A
funnel debriefing was employed to check whether participants
had any suspicion about the anger manipulation: It started
with broad questions about the purpose of the study and
proceeded to very specific questions referring to participants’
understanding of the experimental conditions/design. The vast
majority of individuals had absolutely no clue about the
purpose of the experiment and about the fact that anger was
induced on purpose. To the question regarding how they felt
during the anagram task, most participants responded “I was
mad.”
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TABLE 1 | Correlation of the study variables.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Sex (F = 1) Manip. (anger = l) Irritation Inhibition Activation Neg. ratings
Sex (F = l) 85 0.48 0.50 1.00
Manip. (anger = l) 84 0.54 0.50  0.05 1.00
Irritation 84 5.03 3.19  0.13 0.22⇤ 1.00
Inhibition 75 1142.41 289.05  0.12 0.06 0.00 1.00
Activation 75 1179.47 303.55 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.47⇤ 1.00
Negative ratings 75 1179.47 303.55 0.03 0.27⇤ 0.22⇤ 0.02  0.01 1.00
RESULTS
The anger induction was e ective: subjects judged music/sound
in the background to be more irritating in the anger (M = 5.69,
SD = 3.22) than in the control condition (M = 4.28, SD = 3.02),
F(1,84) = 4.2, p < 0.05. The anger (M = 3.15, SD = 2.41) and
control condition (M = 3.92 SD = 2.41) did not di er in how
much participants liked the music/sound in the background.
Correlations of the study’s variables are reported in Table 1.
Data were analyzed using STATA version 14 (StataCorp, 2015)
and hypothesis tests involved running hierarchical regressions
with robust variance estimation in which the study variables
were entered in sequential steps to predict negative trait ratings.
This analytical strategy was chosen to deal with violations in the
assumption of linear regression, such as normality of residuals.
Only correct answers in the attention task were retained for the
analysis (84% of all answers), and participants who provided less
than 50% of correct answers were excluded from the analysis (8
individuals). RTs faster and slower than 2 standard deviations
from the mean were trimmed.2
Because activation and inhibition were significantly correlated
with each other and to fully understand the contribution
of each of these predictors, we conducted two hierarchical
regressions in which we tested the e ect of each predictor and
the interaction with the anger manipulation. Then we conducted
a third hierarchical regression in which both predictors and
their interaction terms were entered simultaneously. In all the
analyses, we controlled for gender because some studies have
shown that males and females di er with respect to how they
describe emotional experience (Barrett et al., 2000). Activation
and inhibition were centered before conducting the regression
analysis. Results are presented in Table 2.
A comparison of the regression models shows that activation
and inhibition and the interaction with the anger manipulation
term do not predict negative ratings in the social judgment
task when taken individually (Tables 2A,B). However, their
e ect becomes significant once they are entered simultaneously
in the regression model (Table 2C). To plot the significant
interactions (Figure 3), we computed separate regression lines for
each emotion condition (anger/neutral). In the anger condition,
the model was significant, F(1,36) = 3.25, p = 0.05, and both
activation (b =  0.40, t = 2.21, p < 0.05) and inhibition
2The impact of missing data was examined using structural equation modeling
with maximum likelihood estimation for missing data (MLMV). Results were
comparable to those reported.
(b = 0.40, t = 2.20, p < 0.05) were significant predictors.
Individuals in the anger condition rated the target person
particularly negatively when they had shown higher activation in
the attention task (e.g., shorter reaction times after anger target
cues). Similarly, individuals in the anger condition rated the
target person particularly harshly when they had shown higher
inhibition in the attention task (=longer reaction times after
anger distractor cues; Figure 3). In the neutral condition, the
model was not significant F(1,31) = 1.17, p > 0.05. Overall, the
model explained 21% of the total variance in negative ratings.
Overall results were aligned with the hypothesis that both
higher activation and higher inhibition would lead to more
negative ratings (hypothesis 1b). However, the finding that the
e ect of activation and inhibition in the anger condition was
significant only when both variables were entered simultaneously
was unexpected. To further explore their association we tested
the interaction between activation and inhibition (and the
experimental condition, in a 3-way interaction) as a predictor of
negative ratings. Results revealed no significant e ect, indicating
that the contribution of activation and inhibition in predicting
negative ratings is in fact additive, and not interactive.
Finally, because RTs were also collected for happiness and
sadness activation and inhibition, we tested whether they yielded
any significant e ect. Indeed, we hypothesized anger-specific
e ects. Remarkably, activation and inhibition of happiness and
sadness related information did not, individually or jointly,
predict social judgment. This provides supporting evidence that
our e ects are specific to the emotion that was applicable to the
social judgment, namely anger, and that this e ect is not a generic
e ect of activation and inhibition.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to investigate how
individual di erences in the attentional engagement to and
disengagement from anger related stimuli influence processing
biases after experiencing anger. Our study replicates previous
research (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006) showing that incidental
anger results in biased social information processing. After anger
induction, individuals judged another person in an unrelated
situation more negatively.
Moreover, our results add to the literature by providing two
important contributions. First, we show that carryover e ects
are more pronounced in individuals with higher activation
and higher inhibition of attention to anger related stimuli.
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TABLE 2A | Results of the hierarchical regression involving only activation and the interaction with the anger manipulation term as predictors of social judgment (negative
ratings of Donald).
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 F p
St.
Coef.
SE
(Robust)
t p St.
Coef.
SE
(Robust)
t p St.
Coef.
SE
(Robust)|
t p
Sex (F = l) 0.14 0.34 1.29 0.20 0.14 0.34 1.27 0.21 0.13 0.33 1.16 0.25 3.95 0.02
Manip.
(anger = l)
0.26 0.34 2.30 0.02 0.26 0.33 2.30 0.02 0.98 1.26 2.30 0.02
Activation 0.005 0.00 0.05 0.96 0.16 0.00 1.85 0.07 0.00 0.96
Activation ⇥
Manip.
 0.77 0.00  1.78 0.08 3.18 0.08
Constant 5.77 0.28 20.40 0.00
R-square 0.08 0.08 0.12
TABLE 2B | Results of the hierarchical regression involving only inhibition and the interaction with the anger manipulation term as predictors of social judgment (negative
ratings of Donald).
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 F p
St.
Coef.
SE
(Robust)
t P St.
Coef.
SE
(Robust)
t p St.
Coef.
SE
(Robust)
t p
Sex (F = l) 0.11 0.35 0.95 0.35 0.12 0.36 0.99 0.32 312.00 0.38 1.07 0.29 2.44 0.09
Manip.
(anger = l)
0.23 0.35 1.98 0.05 0.22 0.36 1.92 0.06  0.29 1.48  0.60 0.55
Inhibition 0.06 0.00 0.46 0.65  0.05 0.00  0.26 0.80 0.21 0.65
Inhib. ⇥
Manip.
0.55 0.00 1.05 0.30 1.11 0.30
Constant 5.76 0.3 18.91 0.00
R-square 0.06 0.06 0.08
The more individuals engaged attention to anger stimuli,
the more they carried their anger over to an unrelated
situation resulting in more biased social judgments. We
found similar e ects for individuals with higher inhibition of
attention to anger stimuli, who demonstrated stronger biases
after the anger induction. Second, we also show that the
e ect of activation and inhibition emerged only when these
attentional processes additively contributed to performance.
Indeed, when activation and inhibition were taken individually
they did not moderate the carryover e ects of anger on social
judgment.
The case in which the predictive power of two variables
significantly increases once the variables are entered into the
regression model at the same time is known in the literature as
TABLE 2C | Results of the hierarchical regression involving both activation and inhibition and the interaction with the anger manipulation term entered simultaneously as
predictors of social judgment (negative ratings of Donald).
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 F p
St.
Coef.
SE
(Robust)
t p St.
Coef.
SE
(Robust)
t p St.
Coef.
SE
(Robust)
t p
Sex (F = l) 0.15 0.33 1.38 0.19 0.17 0.36 1.44 0.15 0.20 0.35 1.73 0.09 4.10 0.02
Manip.
(anger = l)
0.27 0.33 2.37 0.02 0.27 0.34 2.31 0.02 0.29 1.59 0.54 0.60
Activation  0.04 0.00  0.34 0.74 0.19 0.00 1.74 0.09 0.23 0.80
Inhibition 0.11 0.00 0.67 0.50  0.11 0.00  0.55 0.59
Activation ⇥
Manip.
 1.37 0.00  2.96 0.01 5.38 0.02
Inhib. ⇥
Manip.
1.35 0.00 2.50 0.02
Constant 5.66 0.29 19.65 0.00
R-square 0.09 0.10 0.21
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FIGURE 3 | Judgments of a target (y-axis) tend to be more negative after an anger induction. The greater the activation of attention to anger related stimuli (top
x-axis) the greater the negative judgment; the greater the inhibition of attention to anger stimuli (bottom x-axis) the greater the negative judgment. Note that the RT
scale for activation is interpreted in the opposite way with respect to inhibition: shorter RT indicates stronger activation.
a suppression e ect3 (Conger, 1974). In particular, in the case of a
cooperative or reciprocal suppression (Cohen and Cohen, 1975;
Paulhus et al., 2004) the direction of the association between the
two predicting variables and the outcome is opposite in sign. This
as is also the case for activation, the interaction term of which
is negatively associated with negative ratings, and inhibition, the
interaction term of which is positively associated with negative
ratings. Entering the two interaction terms at the same time
allows partitioning out the shared variance between the two
variables, and lets each unique variance predict the outcome in
opposite directions (for similar cases discussed in the literature
see Verona et al., 2005; Geraghty et al., 2010).
Our results point out that in order to observe carryover
e ects of anger on social judgment the simultaneous e ect of
both activation and inhibition must be taken into account.
Interestingly, the joint e ect of these two variables was additive
rather than interactive, as shown by the analysis in which
3We thank Reviewer 1 for suggesting this possibility.
the interaction between these variables and the experimental
condition was not significant. In other words, both variables
accentuated the carryover e ect of anger, and it seems as if
each of them taken individually was not su cient to bias social
perception; both were necessary for the e ect to emerge.
Two competing explanations may account for the results. The
first explanation refers to the e ect of increased accessibility of
previously processed emotional cues. In the present research,
some participants were better than others at paying attention to
and at ignoring anger-related cues when asked to do so. However,
when no specific instructions were provided about what to do
with similar cues and in a di erent context, the same participants
displayed higher sensitivity to this type of information, which
biased their social perception. It seems as if the e ort to activate
and inhibit anger related information was successful during the
attention task, but at the cost of increasing the availability of
the same type of information later. The results are congruent
with a post-suppression rebound e ect (Wegner, 1994), although
in the present case the increased accessibility of the previously
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suppressed emotion information was exacerbated in individuals
who were also good at activating the same type of information.
An alternative explanation that is also plausible in explaining
results especially in light of the unexpected joint e ect of
activation and inhibition is that participants’ resources might
have been depleted by both the anger manipulation and the
attention task—which were rather cognitively demanding—a
situation that made it likely for any attempt to regulate the
interplay of activation and inhibition in subsequent tasks to fail
(Baumeister et al., 2007). Indeed, our results might describe a
case of self-regulation failure in which being good at engaging
and disengaging attention to emotional cues might have depleted
participants’ resourcesmaking it more likely that carryover e ects
of anger would occur.
It is interesting to notice that the correlation between
activation and inhibition was moderately high and positive
in sign, indicating that on average people who were better
(e.g., quicker) at activating anger related information were
also worse (e.g., quicker) at inhibiting the same type of
information. However, some individuals showed a pattern of
being good at both activating and inhibiting information, and
those were also the individuals who weremore prone to carryover
e ects of anger on social judgment. Indeed, individuals who
possess the cognitively and emotionally taxing combination
of high activation and high inhibition might be exposed to
more rapid consumption of self-regulatory resources, with its
related potential side e ects (Wagner and Heatherton, 2014),
including the undesirable carryover e ects of emotions. Further
research may clarify which account better explains this type of
e ect.
Although we treated activation and inhibition as two separate
individual characteristics, we cannot rule out the possibility that
they tap into the same underlying mechanism, namely sensitivity
to emotion cues. Activation and inhibition certainly share the
same basic attentional resources that depend on the central
executive system. At the same time, it seems as if activation and
inhibition possess distinct features because they simultaneously
and uniquely contribute to the carryover e ect of anger on social
judgment. In fact, when their shared variance is ‘suppressed’
by entering the two interaction term predictors simultaneously,
they only predict negative ratings. Further research should
investigate whether activation and inhibitionmay be conceived as
tapping into the same or distinct cognitive processes, and under
which conditions they may contribute individually or jointly to
behavioral outcomes.
Another important topic for future research is to clarify
whether di erences in engaged and disengaged attention are
stable over time. Similar to previous research, we assessed
attentional processes in one task, and examined their influence
on an unrelated task. Although activation and inhibition of
attention has been treated as an individual di erence variable in
previous research (e.g., Compton, 2000; Moon and Lord, 2006),
it is currently unknown how stable di erences in this ability are
over time. For example, it is possible that attention engagement
and disengagement varies from day to day, and that training
can influence their development (Wadlinger and Isaacowitz,
2011).
IMPLICATIONS
The results have several applications. Perhaps the most important
is that activation and inhibition should be investigated together
to allow for testing potential additive e ects. Omitting either one
may lead to misinterpreting the results, such as finding a lack of
significant e ect, when in fact such an e ect may emerge only if
analyzed together with complementary predictors.
The carryover e ect of anger was less pronounced for
individuals who were medium and low on activation and
inhibition, showing that being less extreme in these two
characteristics led to less biased social perception. In this respect,
Aristotle’s definition of virtue as standing in the middle (also used
by the Latins: in medio stat virtus) highlights the implications
of our findings well. We hypothesized that being e ective at
both activating and inhibiting emotion information might have
significantly taxed cognitive resources leading to undesirable
carryover e ects of anger.
With respect to the literature on emotion congruent e ects
(Forgas, 1995; Schwarz and Clore, 2007), the present results show
that these e ects are moderated by di erences in how emotional
information is processed. Results show that emotion congruent
processing is facilitated in individuals who are able to engage and
disengage attention from emotion cues. More generally, stable
tendencies may interact with situational emotion stimuli leading
to unexpected patterns such as the one we observed.
Becoming aware of the emotion one is feeling during an
activity may be the first step to overcoming carryover e ects of
emotion. For instance, labeling emotional states was found to
reduce its impact on judgment (Keltner et al., 1993). Additionally,
becoming aware of the cause of an emotional reaction is
important to understand whether emotions may be trusted or
not during a specific task. Individuals who tend to question
why they are feeling a certain emotion may be more capable to
regulate emotions according to the situation. The interpretation
of results as depending on depletion of resources following highly
cognitively demanding tasks suggests that taking a break between
two tasks may also be an e ective strategy to limit carryover
e ects of anger.
Finally, the results of this research indicate the importance
of considering individual di erences in investigating the e ect
of emotion on behavior/performance. Had predictions been
made only based on mood congruency models, we would
have expected angry individuals to perceive the target person
more negatively than non-angry individuals. Instead, and in
addition, results showed that the e ect of anger depended on
individual di erences in activation and inhibition. The e ect
of anger was boosted for high activation and high inhibition
individuals, and nullified for low activation and low inhibition
individuals.
In the same line, research on the perception–behavior link
(Bargh, 1990; Bargh and Chartrand, 2000) emphasizes the
ubiquitous e ect of the automatic activation of concepts on
congruent behavior. For instance, participants subtly primedwith
a word referred to rudeness were more likely to behave rudely
(Bargh et al., 1996). Given the importance of these findings, it
seems worth analyzing whether individuals di er in how they
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react to emotions caused by external stimuli of which they are
not aware. Instead of being treated as noise, individual di erences
of this kind may reflect the ability to strategically use emotions
to better adjust to the situation. For instance, the perception
of emotional stimuli may not trigger the same behavior in all
individuals. Some people may behave less rudely than others after
being primed with rudeness because they integrate emotion with
thought and action in a more profitable way, so as to make their
behavior more e ective with respect to the context.
CONCLUSION
We demonstrate the importance of attentional processes
for biasing perception under the influence of anger. These
processes may function as moderators of emotion carryover
e ects. Additionally, results show the perils of the joint
e ect of anger inhibition and activation: being good at both
engaging attention to and disengaging attention from anger-
related cues may have increased the accessibility of similar
emotional information leading to more biased social judgments.
As an alternative, being e ective at engaging attention to
and disengaging attention from anger-related cues may have
depleted regulatory resources resulting in stronger carryover
e ects of anger. These competing explanations merit further
investigation.
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